Tulsa Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 1

Fall 1989

NELPI Energy Law Essay: A Just Injustice: Mississippi Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi
Lorie J. Harris

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lorie J. Harris, NELPI Energy Law Essay: A Just Injustice: Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 25
Tulsa L. J. 97 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Harris: NELPI Energy Law Essay: A Just Injustice: Mississippi Power & Lig

THE 1989 NELPI ENERGY
LAW ESSAY
A JUST INJUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI POWER &
LIGHT CO. v. MISSISSIPPI*
Lorie J. Harrist

I.

INTRODUCTION

"If the regulated accept regulation,... they must be reconciled to

the goldfishbowl life."' The actions of a regulated entity are always subject to review. Review of a regulated entity includes after-the-fact examination of the reasonableness of its actions, frequently focusing on
whether management acted prudently. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC)2 and the state utility commissions have exclusive
jurisdiction, each independent of the other within its limits of authority.
In addition, what is within the FERC's jurisdiction, is not subject to review by the states.' A problem arises when the FERC examines a regulated entity's actions, looks at the goldfish and calls the fish white, while
the state utility commission looks at the same fish and calls it black.
In MississippiPower & Light Co. v. Mississippi4 the Supreme Court
made it clear that where the FERC allocates expenses to operating utilities of a holding company, states are preempted from reviewing the
prudence of those same expenses or the FERC allocation. If the state
* Winning essay of the Thirteenth Annual National Energy Law and Policy Institute Energy
Law Essay Competition.
t Student, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College. B.S., 1974, University of
Oregon. The author wishes to thank Professor William Funk for his patient review and comments.
1. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 13 (1969).
2. Congress created the Federal Power Commission in 1935. It was renamed and somewhat
reorganized into the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1974.
3. 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 1,at 555. See also W. Fox, FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY,
128-29 (Supp. 1989).
4. 108 S.Ct. 2428 (1988).
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commission believes that the expenses incllpded in the wholesale power
allocation to the operating company are unreasonable, it must raise its
objections to the FERC. Thus, the state role is not to judge the reasonableness of the actions on which the FERC allocations are premised.
Rather, the state commission must advocate its position regarding the
prudence of those actions before the FERC.
II. THE FACTS IN THE MISSISSIPPI POWER CASE
Mississippi Power & Light (MP&L) is one of four operating companies owned by Middle South Utilities, Inc. (Middle South).' Middle
South is a registered holding company under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935.6 Three other operating companies owned by
Middle South are Louisiana Power & Light Co. (LP&L), New Orleans
Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI), and Arkansas Power & Light Co.
(AP&L).7 All of the operating companies sell electricity at both wholesale and retail.'
Interaction between the four operating companies of the Middle
South system was specified by three "System Agreements." 9 These
agreements were filed with the FERC in 1951, 1973, and 1982.1" The
purpose of the System Agreements was to coordinate the planning, operation, and construction of electrical generation plants for the operating
companies and to provide a means of equalizing any imbalance in costs
resulting from the construction, ownership, and operation of facilities
used for the mutual benefit of all companies."
In the late 1960's Middle South began diversifying from its predominately oil and gas based generation facilities to coal and nuclear
facilities. 12 One of the Middle South operating utilities, AP&L, had insufficient capacity to meet the demands of its customers. 3 AP&L was
the first of the operating companies to construct a nuclear power plant,
bringing on line Arkansas Nuclear Unit 1 in 1974.14 Unit 2 came on line
5. Id. 2431.
6. Id. at 2432 n.4; See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 2c, 15 U.S.C. § 79a79z-6 (1982).
7. Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2431 n.1.
8. Id. at 2431.
9. Id.
10. Id.
I1. Id. see also Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12. MississippiPower, 108 S.Ct. at 2431.
13. MississippiIndustries, 808 F.2d at 1531.
14. Id.
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in 1980.15 The combined capacity cost of the two plants was approximately $500 per kilowatt.1 6 Two additional nuclear power plants were
planned and constructed by Middle South. One was the Waterford 3
unit, assigned to LP&L, and the other was Grand Gulf 1, initially assigned to MP&L.17 The original planned capacity cost estimates per kilowatt for these plants were comparable to the actual costs of the
Arkansas plants. 18 By the time Grand Gulf began commercial operation,
however, the capacity cost was over $2,900 per kilowatt.' 9
After Grand Gulf was assigned to MP&L, it became apparent that
MP&L on a stand-alone basis lacked the financial resources to construct
the plant due to the magnitude of the construction costs.2 0 Thus in 1974,
Middle South formed a new subsidiary, Middle South Energy, to finance
Grand Gulf and each of the Middle South operating companies agreed to
put their credit standing behind the plant.2z In April 1982, Middle South
filed a new System Agreement with the FERC which governed the exchange of power between the operating companies. 22 In June 1982, Middle South filed a Unit Power Sales Agreement (UPSA) with the FERC
which allocated the output of Grand Gulf between the operating companies. 23 Although all of the operating companies signed the UPSA, none
of the output of Grand Gulf was assigned to AP&L. 4
III.
A.

HISTORY OF THE CASE

The FERC Proceedings

When Middle South filed the System Agreement with the FERC,
the agency instituted a proceeding to determine if the agreement was
' '25
"just and reasonable within the meaning of the Federal Power Act.
When the UPSA was filed a few months later the FERC instituted a
second, separate proceeding to determine if this second agreement was
just and reasonable.2 6 Two administrative law judges (A.L.J.), A.L.J.
Head and A.L.J. Liebman, reviewed the allocation of the Grand Gulf
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at n.15.
Id. (Capacity is the total amount of power generation capability available).
MississippiIndustries, 808 F.2d at 1531.
Id. at 1531 n.16.
MississippiPower, 108 S.Ct. at 2432 n.5.
MississippiIndustries, 808 F.2d at 1533.
Id.
Id. at 1534.
Id. at 1533.
Id.
Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2433.
Id.
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expenses and concluded that the filed agreements should be rejected.
However, they each determined a different method for allocating the
27
costs of Grand Gulf among all of the operating companies.
The FERC reviewed each of the A.L.J.'s opinions and affirmed their
findings that Middle South operated as a highly integrated system. 28 The
FERC, however, rejected A.L.J. Head's finding that Grand Gulf was an
anomaly to the system's historic approach of planning and constructing
new units to satisfy individual operating company's needs. Instead, the
FERC adopted A.L.J. Liebman's findings that the Middle South nuclear
units were constructed to meet the needs of the whole system and the fact
that some were more expensive than others was simply a function of timing and problems unique to the nuclear industry.2 9 It concluded that the
1982 System Agreement combined with A.L.J. Liebman's allocation proposal would result in "just and reasonable results."" ° The resulting allocation method gave rise to the assignment of 36% of the costs of nuclear
capacity to AP&L, 33% to MP&L, 14% to LP&P, and 17% to
NOPSI.3 The UPSA filed by Middle South had alloted none of the cost
of Grand Gulf to AP&L, 31.63% to MP&L, 38.57% to LP&L, and
32
29.80% to NOPSI.
B.

Review of the FERC's Decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia

Consolidating eighteen petitions for review of the FERC decision
regarding Grand Gulf, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the issue of the FERC's jurisdiction and the
merits of its decision.3 3 The court likened the FERC's jurisdiction in
Mississippi to the FERC's jurisdiction in what was then a recently decided Supreme Court case, NantahalaPower & Light Co. v. Thornburg.3 4
The court stated that the FERC's allocation of Grand Gulf's costs was
27. Mississippi Industries, 808 F.2d at 1534-37.
28. Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2434.
29. Id. See also Middle South Energy, Inc. 31 F.E.R.C. f 61,305, at 61,633 (1985).
30. Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2434.
31. Mississippi Industries, 808 F.2d at 1558.
32. Id. at 1554.
33. Id. at 1528-68.
34. 476 U.S. 953 (1986). In Nantahala,a holding company received a fixed amount of low-cost
power from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The company filed an agreement with the
FERC which allocated the low cost power between two operating companies. The FERC modified
the allocation. One of the operating companies filed with the state commission to reflect the cost
impact of the FERC approved allocation in its retail rates. Instead, the state commission found a
different allocation to be proper and allowed rates to reflect the allocation it had determined. The
Supreme Court disallowed the state commission finding, holding that the allocation by the FERC
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similar to the FERC's fixing of the low-cost power entitlement percentages for Nantahala. a5 In both cases the FERC allocated power between
36
the operating companies and in doing so directly affected their costs.
The court then addressed the merits of the FERC decision. The
court found that the FERC could properly decide that all nuclear construction was planned to meet the needs of the whole Middle South system.3 7 Further, by comparing the roughly comparable historical costs of
power for each operating company with the large disparities in nuclear
costs between the operating companies, the FERC could conclude that
the filed agreements were not reasonable and that undue discrimination
existed.3a Moreover, the court held that the FERC's choice of allocating
the entire nuclear investment was within the agency's discretion. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit initially denied petitions for rehearing. However, in reconsidering the denial, the court remanded the case to the FERC for reconsideration in order to allow it to explain the criteria used in determining undue
discrimination and to explain why the FERC decision was not unduly
discriminatory.' In response to the remand, the FERC issued an order
41
reaffirming its prior decision on the allocation of Grand Gulf expenses.
C. State Commission Proceedings
MP&L filed an application with the Mississippi Public Service Commission (MPSC) in November 1984, requesting an increase in the rates it
charged to Mississippi customers.4 2 The costs justifying the requested
43
increase included in part the costs associated with Grand Gulf. The
MPSC issued an order in June 1985, one day after the FERC issued its
decision, allowing an increase only to recover non-Grand Gulf costs.'
Citing the FERC decision, MP&L filed for rehearing.4 5 The MPSC
had to be recognized by the state commission and reflected in the rates that the operating company
charged its retail customers.

Id.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Mississippi Industries, 808 F.2d at 1542.
Id.
Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1556-57.
Id. at 1557.
Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
System Energy Resources, Inc., 41 F.E.R.C. 61,238 (1987).
MississippihIdustries, 108 S.Ct. at 2435.
Id.
Id. at 2435-36
Id.
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thereafter issued a new order allowing recovery of all of the Grand Gulf
costs allocated to MP&L by the FERC.4 6
D. Proceedingsin State Court
The Mississippi Attorney Gerneral and the Mississippi Legal Services Coalition appealed the order issued by the MPSC to the Mississippi
Supreme Court.4 7 The primary assertion of error was that the MPSC
had allowed recovery of expenses for Grand Gulf without first determining that those expenses had been prudently incurred."a The MPSC had
authority to establish just and reasonable rates which allow the utility an
opportunity to earn a fair rate of return. 9 The Misssissippi Supreme
Court had interpreted a fair rate to be "one which, under prudent and
economical management, is just and reasonable to both the public and
the utility."5 The court concluded that Middle South appeared to have
effectively evaded any review of the prudence of Grand Gulf.5 ' Further,
it did not believe that the law required it to blindly pass through a $326
52
million rate increase without any look at the prudence of the expense.
The court stated,
we do not challenge the FERC's jurisdiction over interstate wholesale
rates. We do not, however, construe Nantahala as forcing the MPSC
to set rates based on the construction and operation of a plant (nuclear
or otherwise) that generates power that is not needed at a price that is
not prudent .... MP&L, however, asks us to take the position that,
because Grand Gulf is owned by an out of state corporation, the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution precludes any review of Grand Gulf, and forces unneeded power down the throats of
Mississippi ratepayers. We do not believe the preemption doctrine
53
ever intended to accomplish such an inequitable and unjust result.
The court noted that MP&L had enough generation without Grand Gulf
to put it 85% over peak demand. Moreover, MP&L admitted to selling
less expensive energy outside its system and retaining the more expensive
Grand Gulf power for its retail customers.5 4 The court also found that
the FERC had made no finding regarding whether the completion of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 2436.
State ex. rel. Pittman v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 506 So.2d 978 (1987).
Id. at 979.
Id. at 984.
Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2436 (emphasis added).
Id.
Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comin it, 506 So. 2d at 984.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 985.
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Grand Gulf was prudent, because the issue was never presented." Thus,
it concluded that state review was not preempted. Accordingly, the
court remanded the case to the MPSC to review the prudence of the
investment before allowing recovery of the costs in retail rates.5 6 Specifically, the court stated that the review should determine whether MP&L
and Middle South acted reasonably in constructing Grand Gulf.57
IV.

THE

MissIssiPpiPOWER

DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

MP&L appealed the Mississippi Supreme Court decision to the
United States Supreme Court.5 8 The United States Supreme Court
phrased the question presented in this case as "whether the FERC proceedings have pre-empted such a prudency inquiry by the State Commission." 59 The Court answered the question indirectly, rather than
directly. First, it stated that the FERC has exclusive authority over
wholesale rates and allocations, and states may not alter those rates or
allocations.6" This inability to modify an allocation is consistent with
Nantahala,where the Court stated that "when FERC sets a rate between
a seller of power and wholesaler-as-buyer, a State may not exercise its
undoubted jurisdiction over retail sales to prevent the wholesaler-asseller from recovering the costs of paying the FERC-approved rate."'"
The Court then stated that the question is not whether the FERC has
examined a specific issue, but whether it was in the FERC's jurisdiction
to examine it at all. It supported that finding, stating that the "bright
line" 62 between state and federal jurisdiction was developed to make
such case by case analysis unnecessary.6 3 Finally, it concluded that the
FERC's order bars the state commission from examining the prudence of
MP&L and Middle South actions because any such review would have to
55. Id. at 987.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2431.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2438.
61. Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 960 (1986).
62. The "bright line" doctrine followed from F.P.C. v. Southern Cal, Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205
(1964). In that case, the FPC asserted jurisdiction over a wholesale transaction in California because
a portion of the power delivered could be traced to an out of state source. The Supreme Court
stated, "Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction, making unnecessary such case-by-case analysis." To establish that bright line, the Court interpreted the Federal Power Act to give the FPC jurisdiction over "all wholesale sales in interstate
commerce except those which Congress has made explicitly subject to regulation by the States."
Id. at 215-16.
63. MississippiPower, 108 S.Ct. at 2440.
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consider at least some of the same transactions that the FERC had already reviewed in determining a reasonable allocation of costs between
the operating companies.64
The Supreme Court decision raises at least five questions:
1. Did the decision in Nantahalacompel the conclusion here?
2. Was the MississippiPower decision reasonable?
3. How did the decision affect the role of the state utility commission in reviewing interstate holding company actions?
4. What are the broader implications for jurisdiction of prudence reviews?
5. What was the impact on state commission review of quantity purchases under a FERC approved wholesale rate?
Because the Supreme Court based its holding in MississippiPower on
the holding in Nantahala, a thorough review of Nantahala is necessary
before responding to the questions raised here.
A.

Does Nantahala Govern This Case?
1. The NanatahalaDecision

Nantahala Power & Light and Tapoco, Inc. are wholly owned subsidiaries of Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa).65 The power produced by the facilities of both subsidiaries went to the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA).6 6 In exchange, Nantahala and Tapoco received a fixed
amount of low-cost power from TVA.6 7 Nantahala met its additional
power requirements through purchases of more expensive power from
TVA.6" Alcoa filed an agreement with the FERC which allocated 20%
of the low-cost power to Nantahala and 80% to Tapoco.69 In 1976,
Nantahala filed a proposal for a wholesale rate increase with the
FERC. ° One of its wholesale customers objected to the allocation of
low-cost power, arguing for a different methodology that would lower
Nantahala's costs and increase Tapoco's.71 The FERC reviewed the allocation agreement and found that it was unfair to Nantahala.72 Accordingly, the FERC modified the rate increase proposal to allow Nantahala
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Nantahala,476 U.S. at 954.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id. at 955-56
Id. at 956.
Id.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 958.
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to recover only those increased costs it would have if it received 22.5% of

the power and Tapoco received 77.5%.73 Thereafter, Nantahala filed a
request with the North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) to raise
its intrastate retail rates. The NCUC rejected the costs which the FERC
had allowed, finding them unreasonable. They found that Nantahala
should have received 24.5% of the low-cost power. The NCUC disallowed costs incurred as a result of receiving less. 74 The state supreme
court affirmed the NCUC decision, finding that the decision did not order Nantahala to violate a FERC order. 75 Rather, the court said, the
NCUC decision merely prevented Nantahala from recovering costs
which it need not have incurred if it had reached a fair agreement for
allocating the low cost power.76 The court found this to be within the
jurisdiction of state regulation.7 7
The United States Supreme Court found that the filed rate doctrine 78 assists in enforcing the supremacy clause, and held that the state
utility commission must allow costs in retail rate proceedings which the
FERC has allowed as reasonable operating expenses in wholesale rate
proceedings. 79 The Court referenced Narragansett Electric Co. v.
Burke8" in concluding that state review was preempted, 8 ' and went on to
73. Id. at 958-59.
74. Id. at 960-61.
75. Id. at 961.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The filed rate doctrine was established in Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub.
Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951). In that case the Supreme Court reversed a District Court holding
that a contract filed with the FERC was void and unreasonable. The District Court had determined
a reasonable rate. The Supreme Court held that "the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate
which the [Federal Power] Commission files or fixes, and that, except for review of the Commission's
orders, the courts can assume no right to a different one on the ground that, in its opinion, it is the
only or the more reasonable one."
Id. at 251-52.
79. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 964-65.
80. 119 R.I. 559, 381 A.2d 1358 (1977). In Narragansett,the state supreme court reviewed the
state Public Utility Commission (PUC) decision and held that the PUC was preempted by the Federal Power Act from investigating the reasonableness of an interstate wholesale rate. Narragansett, a
wholly owned subsidiary of The New England Electric System, filed proposed rates with the PUC to
pass through to its retail customers the increased expense of purchasing power from a sister operating company. This increased expense resulted from the sister operating company filing a wholesale
rate with the FPC, which the FPC approved. The PUC evaluated the reasonableness of the costs
underlying the new FPC wholesale rate and concluded that Narragansett could recover approximately 60% of the expense it incurred. However, the state supreme court held that the FPC filed
rate must be treated as an actual operating expense. The PUC, however, did not have to pass
through the increase but could investigate the overall financial position of the company and determine if offsetting cost savings had occurred.
Id.
81. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 965.
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say that the state may look only at whether other cost savings might
offset the increase.8 2 The Court further discussed the filed rate doctrine,
recognizing that this case did not follow the typical application of the
doctrine.8 3 The Court stated, "[t]he filed rate doctrine ensures that sellers of wholesale power governed by FERC can recover the costs incurred
by their payment of just and reasonable FERC-set rates." 84
The Court went on to say that the North Carolina Supreme Court
should not have relied on cases like Pike County Light & Power Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,85 which discussed the reasonableness of purchasing from a particular source rather than the payment
of a FERC rate.86 In dictum, the Court preserved a Pike County exception by discussing the reasonableness of purchase situation saying, "we
may assume that a particular quantity of power procured by a utility
from a particular source could be deemed unreasonably excessive if lower
cost power is available elsewhere, even though the higher cost power actually purchased is obtained at a FERC-approved, and therefore reasonable, price."87 The Court concluded that Nantahala could not have
treated itself as having access to more power than allowed by the
FERC.8 8 Thus, its purchase of more expensive power from TVA was not
unreasonable.
2.

The Mississippi Power Decision

The Supreme Court stated that the facts of MississippiPower cannot
be distinguished in any relevant way from those underlying its decison in
8 9 In Nantahala,the FERC had allocated low-cost
Nantahala.
power be9
tween two subsidiaries. " The state utility commission reviewed the same
82. Id. at 967-68.
83. Id. at 969.
84. Id. at 970.
85. 77 Pa. Commw. 268, 465 A.2d 735 (1983). Pike County purchased power from its parent
holding company through an agreement filed with the FERC. The Pennsylvania Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) disallowed recovery of a portion of the expense incurred by Pike County under
the agreement because alternative, more economical supplies of power existed. The court differentiated between the purchase and the sale of wholesale power and upheld the PUC decision. It concluded that the FERC determined whether it was in the public interest for the parent company to
charge a particular rate in light of its costs, but that the FERC made no determination as to whether
it is in the public interest for an operating company topay that price given its alternatives. The latter
determination was left to the state PUC.
Id.
86. Nantahala,476 U.S. at 972.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 972-73.
89. MississippiPower, 108 S.Ct. at 2439.
90. Id.
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allocation that the FERC reviewed, but reached a different interpretation
of what is a just and reasonable allocation of low-cost power.
In MississippiPower, the FERC reviewed a contract which allocated
costs of Grand Gulf among affiliates and set allocations for each affiliate.
The FERC proceedings focused on the issue of cost allocation, rather
than the prudence of those costs. The state public utility commission
initially allowed MP&L to recover the costs of Grand Gulf allocated by
the FERC. However, the state supreme court remanded the state utility
commission decision, ordering the commission to examine the prudence
of the investment in Grand Gulf. The state court essentially told the
commission to re-examine the reasonableness of costs that were the basis
for the allocation established by the FERC. Because any disallowance of
expense due to imprudent investment would have effectively reduced the
allocation of Grand Gulf costs to MP&L below the percent allocated by
the FERC,9 1 the case was similar to Nantahala. In Nantahala,the state
utility commission directly re-examined the reasonableness of the FERC
allocation. Here, if the state utility commission addressed the prudence
of the investment, it would have indirectly re-examined the FERC
allocation.
Mississippi Power is unique because it addresses both the explicit
question of the prudence of an investment in a nuclear power plant and
the allocation of that investment by the FERC. The FERC had previously reviewed transactions of interstate pool arrangements for their prudence and concluded that states are preempted from reviewing the same
transactions for prudence.92 However, in prior reviews of the prudence
of transactions, the FERC did not establish an allocation. Thus, in the
prior cases the state could not reconsider the cost that was found reasonable by the FERC as part of the wholesale rate, but the state could review the retail ratepayers' need for the quantity of power purchased
under the rate in light of the other alternatives available. 93
Here, the FERC had determined the reasonableness of the allocation of the expenses. Given the FERC's exclusive authority over allocations established in Nantahala, the states were then barred from any
review which would result in finding a different allocation reasonable.
91. Id.
92. See AEP Generating Co., 29 F.E.R.C. 61,246 (1984) (FERC concluded the prudence of
an agreement to purchase power between two subsidiaries of an interstate holding company was
within its jurisdiction. However, it stated it did not intend to consider the prudence of the agreement
in light of available alternative power supplies.)
93. Id. See also Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 77 Pa.
Commw. 268, 465 A.2d 735 (1983).
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Was the Decision Reasonable?

Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun questioned the reasonableness of the decision. Their dissent stated that the issue of the allocation of the Grand Gulf investment was different from the issue of the
prudence of the investment. The dissent noted that the states traditionally have had jurisdiction over the question of who paid.9 4 If expenses
were prudently incurred, recovery from retail customers was allowed
through increased prices. If they were imprudently incurred, the stockholders would absorb the expenses which would result in a lower return
on their investment. Moreover, the dissenters argued that the FERC had
not addressed the question of prudence of the investment in Grand Gulf
and the state utility commission had jurisdiction over the issue.95 The
dissenters apparently believed that the FERC allocated costs between operating companies, but the state decided how much of those costs were
prudent and effectively allocated the operating company's costs between
the stockholders and the retail customers of the operating companies.
The problem with this argument is the two-level review that would
result from its application. Under the argument in the dissent, the state
could review the same costs on which the FERC had premised the allocation. Under the second review, if a state found a cost to be imprudent,
it could exclude those costs from the costs that the operating company
was allowed to recover from retail ratepayers. Thus, the state would
have effectively disallowed the operating company from recovering costs
that the FERC found were reasonably allocated to the company. To
avoid such two-level review the majority and the concurrence by Justice
Scalia concluded that the FERC has jurisdiction over the prudence of the
costs underlying an allocation regardless of whether the issue is raised in
96
a particular proceeding.
The two-level review advocated by the dissent is inappropriate for
three reasons; (1) it undermines the FERC allocation, (2) it is not consistent with prior interpretations of FERC jurisdiction, and (3) it can not be
practically applied because of the structure of Middle South. First, the
majority recognized that if state review of prudence were allowed, the
FERC's allocation of costs would be undermined. The majority stated
"[i]t is clear that the only purpose of the prudence review ordered by the
Mississippi Supreme Court was to determine whether the costs the
94. MississippiPower, 108 S.Ct. at 2446 (Brennan, J., dissenting.)
95. Id. at 2445.
96. Id.
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FERC had directed MP&L to pay for its allocation of Grand Gulf power
should be 'trapped' or passed on to MP&L's retail customers." 9 7 In
Nantahala, the Court held that the trapping of federally mandated costs
was preempted. The Court described trapping as preventing the seller of
the wholesale power from recovering the costs of paying a FERC approved wholesale rate.9" A two-level review of transactions would likely
result in such a trapping.
Second, the dissenters' argument violates the traditional interpretation of FERC jurisdiction. The transactions at issue in this case were
transactions for wholesale power between operating companies in different states. Therefore, it made sense that regulation of those interstate
transactions occurred at the federal level. A conclusion to the contrary
not only would defeat the Nantahala holding regarding the exclusive jurisdiction of the FERC but also would allow each state to set retail rates
based on their determination of the prudence of the costs on which the
FERC allocation was premised. Such multiple review of the same issue
in each state would be counter to the purpose of the Federal Power
Act,9 9 which gives the FERC jurisdiction over interstate sales of
power.' 0 0 Further, the two-level review violates the filed rate doctrine' 0 1
by allowing state utility commissions to indirectly price wholesale power
at a rate other than that approved by the FERC.
Third, the Court's decision is reasonable for interstate holding companies because of their interstate structure. Absent other problems, the
dissenters' argument could only function in a practical sense if each operating company had different stockholders from each of the other operating companies. But MP&L and its sister operating companies were
wholly owned subsidiaries of Middle South. Therefore, the stockholders
were stockholders of Middle South, the interstate holding company.
With this type of interstate structure, federal jurisdiction over the stockholder/customer question is more sensible than state jurisdiction. With
state jurisdiction, each state would make an independent decision concerning the amount that the stockholders of the interstate company
97. Id. at 2439 n.12.
98. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 970.
99. In 1927, the Supreme Court held in Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273
U.S. 83 (1927), that the states cannot regulate interstate sales of electricity. The Court further held
that regulation of rates for interstate service was an area for Congress. Thus, what is commonly
referred to as the Attleboro gap was created. To fill the gap Congress passed the Federal Power Act
of 1935, which created the Federal Power Commission (FPC). The FPC was renamed and somewhat redefined as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1974.
100. See The Federal Power Act, ch. 12, 16 U.S.C § 824d (1982).
101. See supra note 77.
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should pay. These decisions would likely reflect a states' self interest and
not fairly consider the stockholder's interest in the economic viability of
the interstate holding company. Such an outcome would be counter to
the purpose of regulation, which is to protect the public interest while
allowing the utility company an opportunity to earn a reasonable return
on its investment.102
C. Future Implications of the Mississippi Power Decision
1. The Role of the State Public Utility Commission
The Mississippi Power decision is significant because it clarifies the
meaning of the FERC's exclusive authority established in Nantahala. It
clarifies that exclusive means not shared at all. Therefore, the Nantahala
decision has removed from the states any jurisdiction over major sources
of expense of interstate holding companies' wholesale power transactions, when the FERC has set an allocation of costs based on those
transactions.
The Supreme Court in Mississippi Power clearly limits the state
agency to participation in front of the FERC and does not allow it a
second look at the same actions on which the FERC premises the wholesale cost allocation under the guise of a prudence review.10 3 As pointed
out earlier, this means that there will not even be a second look at the
amount of wholesale power that has been prudently purchased because
the FERC will also have set the allocations.0 4
In sum, the Court's decision defines the role of the state agency as
an advocate, not a judge in regard to the wholesale power transactions of
an interstate holding company when the FERC allocates costs based on
those transactions. The state must make its argument regarding the prudence of a wholesale power investment or transaction entered into by an
interstate holding company, in front of the FERC or lose the opportunity
to be heard. 1o5 In addition, in a FERC proceeding addressing the allocation of costs, the state agency must raise any questions concerning the
prudence of the quantity of purchase.
However, jurisdiction does remain with the state commission to review the overall financial condition of the operating company and to offset the increased expenses resulting from the FERC allocation with any
102.
103.
104.
105.

A. PRIEST, supra note 1, at 4.
MississippiPower, 108 S.Ct. at 2440.
Id.
Id. at 2441.
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cost savings that have occurred in other areas.10 6 Further, the state
commission can shape the recovery of the FERC mandated costs to moderate the impact on the retail customer as long as the utility is allowed to
10 7
recover eventually its expenses.
2.

Selecting Jurisdiction

The majority of the Court stated that while the FERC did not directly discuss the issue of prudence, the FERC could have considered it
in determining the allocation if the issue had been raised." °8 Thus, the
majority opinion clearly establishes that the FERC's jurisdiction includes
the evaluation of the prudence of management decisions which are related to an interstate pool's operation.
The dissent has correctly recognized the implication of this decision.
It stated that an interstate pool arrangement could choose whether it
wanted the prudence of the construction of a generating facility to fall
under FERC or state jurisdiction.'0 9 If power were needed by one operating company and the plant were constructed and operated as part of
the operating company, selling power to its retail customers, the issue of
the prudence of the investment would fall under state jurisdiction. However, if one operating company needed power and the holding company
or interstate pool formed a subsidiary responsible for the generating facility, it could sell the power at wholesale and the prudence of the investment would fall under the jurisdiction of the FERC. For example,
assume a situation where all of the output of a new generating facility is
needed to meet the needs of MP&L retail customers. If the new plant
had been constructed solely by MP&L, with all the power used to serve
the needs of MP&L retail customers, the issue of prudence would be
within the jurisdiction of the state utility commission. However, if Middle South preferred to have the prudence of the new power plant subject
to the review of the FERC, it would construct the plant through a wholly
owned subsidiary and sell all the power wholesale to MP&L for MP&L
retail customers. Given the perception of more favorable regulation by
the FERC, one would anticipate that interstate holding companies would
106. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 967-68.
107. The Mississippi Public Service Commission had originally ordered one half of the increase
to be phased in over a five year period with the remaining one half deferred and recovered over a
forty year period.
108. Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2440-41.
109. Id. at 2449.
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construct any future electrical generation plant through construction
subsidiaries.
3. State Review of the Quantity of Purchase
The Court clearly stated in MississippiPower that where the FERC
has allocated the quantity of purchase in an interstate pool arrangement
the state must accept that quantity as reasonable. The Court made broad
statements that could be cited to support an argument that state review
of the quantity of power purchased under a FERC wholesale rate has
been eliminated. However, all discussion was in the context of an interstate pool arrangement where the FERC had set the quantity purchased
by establishing allocation. Moreover, the Court specifically stated that
MP&L had no legal right to purchase less than the FERC allocated
amount; thus, it did not fall within the exception in Nantahala.
In dicta in Nantahala,the Court preserved for the states the ability
to review the quantity of power purchased under a FERC rate where the
FERC did not set an allocation.'1 l Since Mississippi Power dealt only
with an interstate pool arrangement, it did not affect the dicta in
Nantahala. Therefore, state review of the quantity of wholesale power
purchased for non-interstate pool arrangements will still be allowed according to the dicta in Nantahala and the decision in Pike County.
V.

CONCLUSION

At least the language, if not the outcome, of the Mississippi Power
decision reflects a confusion that results from an interstate pool arrangement because the "entities wholesaling the power are the same ones
purchasing and retailing that power.""' However, the Mississippi
Power decision impacts the law in the area of interstate pool arrangements in three significant ways. First, the Supreme Court clearly reinforces the FERC's exclusive jurisdiction over allocations affecting
wholesale rates." 2 Second, it reaffirms that the states cannot find FERC
wholesale rates and any associated allocation unreasonable." 3 Finally, it
clarifies that the FERC has jurisdiction over review of the prudence of
4
investment or operations of an interstate pool arrangement."
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Nantahala,476 U.S. at 972.
Mississippi Power, 108 S.Ct. at 2446.
Id. at 2440.
Id.
Id. at 2441.
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In conclusion, MississippiPower eliminates any state utility commission review of the prudence of interstate holding company's wholesale
power transactions, where the FERC has established the allocation of the
costs to the operating utilities. An exception remains for the review of
the prudence of the quantity purchased in a situation where the FERC
has not preempted such review by establishing an allocation of the cost.
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